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PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER:  
HOW USING COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
CAN HELP SOLVE THE CLIMATE  
CHANGE PUZZLE 
John A.T. Canale* 
Abstract: Comprehensive land-use development and planning at the state 
or national level is necessary to curb greenhouse gas emissions. A com-
prehensive federal approach that employs a cooperative federalism struc-
ture would be the ideal solution to the current threat posed by global cli-
mate change. In order to best implement such a system, legislators should 
consider the smart-growth projects in California and Georgia to ultimately 
decrease the emissions of greenhouse gases that result from the over-
reliance on automobile transport in the United States. 
Introduction 
 Climate change threatens human health and the environment on 
which we depend.1 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which cause cli-
mate change, result in incremental environmental changes that affect 
our daily lives and may cause catastrophic weather events.2 All nations 
produce these emissions, but the United States contributes an exorbi-
tant percentage of worldwide emissions in relation to its population,3 
due in large part to the nation’s reliance on automobile travel.4 Al-
though the international community needs to make a concerted ef-
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–22 (2007) (citing significant environ-
mental harms of climate change); Dave Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment 
Law, 33 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 57, 64–65 (2008); Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: A Le-
gal, Political, and Moral Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 577, 581–82 
(2007). 
2 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–22; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 37 (2007), available at http://www. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; Wood, supra note 1, at 581–82. 
3 Rachael Rawlings & Robert Paterson, Sustainable Buildings and Communities: Climate 
Change and the Case for Federal Standards, 19 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 335, 341 (2010). 
4 See Catherine J. LaCroix, Land Use and Climate Change: Is It Time for a National Land 
Use Policy?, 35 Ecology L. Currents 124, 124 (2008); U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp. 
Educ. Fund (U.S. PIRG), The Carbon Boom: State and National Trends in Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions Since 1990, at 4 (2007), available at https://pincdn.s3.amazonaws. 
com/assets/upWJ1agKj7szeI-OUSnI1A/carbonboom07.pdf. 
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fort,5 the U.S. government, in particular, must act decisively and swiftly 
to abate future effects of climate change due to its emission contribu-
tions. Currently, the federal government is taking small steps to whittle 
away at the problem.6 Recently, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) set limits on new vehicle emissions to combat climate change.7 
 Comprehensive land-use development planning at the state or na-
tional level is necessary to curb GHG emissions.8 Land-use plans can 
decrease pollution and GHG emissions from automobiles by decreasing 
the distances that people travel in their cars.9 A comprehensive federal 
approach to smarter development should be adopted to avoid the cata-
strophic consequences of climate change.10 The federal government 
should use a cooperative federalism framework to implement statewide 
or regional programs based on programs in California and Georgia.11 
 Part I of this Note provides a background on climate change, land-
use planning, zoning, sprawl, and the negative effects of sprawl on GHG 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Wood, supra note 1, at 587; Michael T. Donnellan, Note, Transportation Control 
Plans Under the 1990 Clean Air Act as a Means for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 16 Vt. L. 
Rev. 711, 711 (1992). 
6 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523–25 (discussing standing, the Supreme Court 
noted that agencies take incremental steps towards abating climate change); see, e.g., 49 
C.F.R. §§ 531.1–.5, 533.1–.6 (2010). 
7 49 C.F.R. §§ 531.1–.5. 
8 See generally William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional 
Capacity, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 57 (1999) (discussing urban sprawl’s detrimental effects on 
climate and the traditionally limited federal role in land-use decisions); LaCroix, supra 
note 4; Jeremy R. Meredith, Note, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 Va. L. Rev. 447 
(2003); Morgan E. Rog, Note, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use, and the 
Environment, 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 707 (2010). 
9 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 66–67; Donnellan, supra note 5, at 711; Rawlings & Pater-
son, supra note 3, at 361. 
10 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 127 (advocating for a comprehensive land-use policy to 
“save the planet”). 
11 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32 (2009); S.B. 375, 2008 Cal. Stat. 728, § 1(b), (c) (relevant 
regulations can be found in part in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 14,522.11 (2010)) [hereinaf-
ter SB 375]; see also Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21,061.3, 21,155, 21,159.28 (West Supp. 2012). 
This argument is an extension of Mary D. Nichols’ argument in California’s Climate Change 
Program: Lessons for the Nation, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 185, 212 (2009) [hereinafter 
Nichols, Lessons]. In that article, Nichols discusses the many statutes, administrative ac-
tions, and executive orders that California uses to combat global warming, and suggests 
that the federal government should use a cooperative federalism framework and model a 
statute on California’s “blueprint.” Id. In Darren A. Prum & Sarah L. Catz, Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Targets and Mass Transit: Can the Government Successfully Accomplish Both Without a 
Conflict?, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935, 965 (2011), the authors also offer the option of the 
federal government implementing the California model on a national basis. It is worth-
while to also look to the Georgia Regional Transportation Act for additional considera-
tions on designing regional or statewide land-use programs. There are advantages to com-
bining aspects of both states’ approaches to build a more effective program. 
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emissions.12 Part II discusses the regulation of GHGs through the Clean 
Air Act (CAA), California’s Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), and Atlanta’s Re-
gional Transportation Act.13 Part III discusses how cooperative federal-
ism—as exemplified in the CAA and the Coastal Zone Management 
Act—and smart growth can reduce GHG emissions.14 Finally, Part IV 
argues the federal government should lower GHG emissions and slow 
climate change by implementing a cooperative federalism framework 
for smarter growth based on the California and Georgia models.15 
I. The Climate Change Problem 
 Climate change is one of the most pressing negative effects associ-
ated with increased GHG emissions.16 The greenhouse effect regulates 
the Earth’s temperature.17 The Sun sends energy to Earth, which is 
then radiated back to space as heat.18 Some of this heat gets trapped in 
the Earth’s atmosphere by gases such as carbon dioxide.19 The combus-
tion of fossil fuels releases GHGs, which then accumulate in the atmos-
phere causing an enhanced greenhouse effect20 and increases global 
temperatures.21 Climate change threatens to increase sea levels, cause 
irreversible damage to ecosystems, significantly reduce winter snow-
pack, increase the ferocity of weather events such as hurricanes, and 
increase the spread of disease.22 
 In 2007, the United States Public Interest Research Group Educa-
tion Fund (U.S. PIRG) released a report concerning global tempera-
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 16–86 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 87–160 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 161–194 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 195–267 and accompanying text. 
16 See Wood, supra note 1, at 580–84. 
17 Id. at 578. 
18 Id.; IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, FAQ 1.3 What Is the Greenhouse Ef-
fect?, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_ 
and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-1-3.html (last visited May 15, 2012). 
19 See Wood, supra note 1, at 578; IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, 
FAQ 1.1 What Factors Determine the Earth’s Climate?, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-1-1.html (last visited 
May 15, 2012). 
20 See Wood, supra note 1, at 579; IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, supra note 18. 
21 See Owen, supra note 1, at 64–65; Joshua K. Westmoreland, Note, Global Warming and 
Originalism: The Role of the EPA in the Obama Administration, 37 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 225, 
228 (2010). 
22 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–22; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, supra note 2, at 30; Westmoreland, supra note 21, at 228–30. 
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ture changes.23 According to U.S. PIRG, temperatures have hit a record 
high, with the previous nine years ranking among the twenty-five 
warmest for the contiguous United States.24 Changing temperatures 
have also increased the number and severity of extreme weather events 
and shifted the growing seasons for many crops.25 Furthermore, rising 
sea levels have begun to consume coastal lands in states such as Massa-
chusetts and California, and could cause hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in remediation costs for property damage.26 
 Carbon dioxide levels are significantly higher than in the pre-
industrial era, in part because of the widespread use of automobiles.27 
GHG emissions will likely continue to rise due to increased travel and a 
growing population.28 The United States produces a disproportionate, 
and exorbitantly large, amount of GHG emissions—representing only 
five percent of the world population, but twenty-five percent of GHG 
emissions.29 
 Much of America’s disproportionate contribution to global GHG 
emissions is due to increasing automobile use, which does not appear 
to be slowing.30 When the EPA started regulating air pollution with the 
CAA in 1970, there were approximately 200 million Americans, who 
owned 98 million vehicles that travelled an average of 5440 miles annu-
ally.31 In 1996, there were over 265 million Americans, who owned over 
198 million vehicles that drove 9357 miles annually.32 On average, 
Americans drive their cars about one hour each day on over four mil-
lion miles of public roadways.33 Each increase in vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) increases GHG emissions, which ultimately contribute to cli-
mate change.34 VMTs vary depending on how far people have to travel 
                                                                                                                      
23 U.S. PIRG, supra note 4. Average annual U.S. temperatures are over two degrees 
Fahrenheit higher than they were 100 years ago. Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 338. 
24 U.S. PIRG, supra note 4; Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 338. 
25 Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 338; see Owen, supra note 1, at 65. 
26 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523. 
27 See Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 339, 361. 
28 Id. at 341–42. 
29 Id. at 341. 
30 See id. at 361; Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 
36 Hous. L. Rev. 679, 692 n.97 (1999). 
31 Reitze, supra note 30, at 692 n.97. 
32 Id. 
33 Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 Stan. En-
vtl. L.J. 141, 151 (1998). 
34 See Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 361. 
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for daily activities,35 and could be counteracted by land-use regulations 
that minimize the distance individuals must travel for daily activities.36 
A. Land-Use Regulation 
 Governments enact land-use regulations to divide the uses of land 
for various purposes.37 Local governments, rather than the federal gov-
ernment, primarily regulate land use in the Unites States.38 Within met-
ropolitan areas, many small communities have land-use powers.39 Local 
governments have no legal obligation to coordinate land development 
with their neighbors.40 Therefore, lack of regional planning can cause 
disjointed and uncoordinated growth.41 
 Local governments have land-use responsibilities as a result of their 
local police power, and the Tenth Amendment’s limits on federal au-
thority.42 The police power is an inherent government authority to 
make regulations that interfere with private activity to protect the gen-
eral welfare, health, and safety of the jurisdiction.43 Because of this tra-
dition in local land-use regulation, any federal intervention into this 
realm could be attacked as an encroachment upon the local police 
power.44 
 Federal funding that is contingent on specific state behavior is 
constitutionally permissible, if that behavior is voluntary.45 The federal 
government violates the Tenth Amendment, however, if it coerces the 
states.46 Therefore, the federal government may influence state deci-
sions on land use through the spending power.47 Partially due to these 
Tenth Amendment federalism concerns, the United States does not 
                                                                                                                      
35 See id. at 362; Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Vehicles Miles Travelled: Integrating the California Environmental Quality Act with 
the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 Ecology L.Q. 71, 80–81 (2009). 
36 See Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 362; Malaczynski & Duane, supra note 35, at 
80–81. 
37 See Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Introduction and User’s Guide, in Zoning 
and Land Use Controls § 1.02[1] (2011), available at LexisNexis ZLANDU. 
38 LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See U.S. Const. amend. X; William A. Fischel, Zoning and Land Use Regulation, in En-
cyclopedia of Law and Economics 403, 404–05 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000); Buzbee, supra note 8, at 98–100. 
43 Rohan & Kelly, supra note 37, § 1.03[2][a]. 
44 Buzbee, supra note 8, at 99–100. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 99–101; see U.S. Const. amend. X. 
47 Buzbee, supra note 8, at 99–101. 
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currently use a rational cohesive land-use plan.48 Moreover, states often 
do not venture into the realm of local land-use planning.49 
B. Zoning 
 The implementation of zoning plans is a central aspect of local 
land use.50 Zoning law developed in response to public awareness 
about city life during the Industrial Age and its detrimental effects on 
public health and the environment.51 Typically, a locality designates 
zones for different uses and identifies them on a zoning map.52 These 
constraints limit what a property owner can and cannot do with their 
property.53 Zoning laws separated uses between properties and there-
fore prevented certain uses on abutting properties.54 For instance, a 
locality would designate the potential uses for properties as residential, 
commercial, or industrial.55 Residential zones are generally grouped 
together and separated from commercial and industrial zones, al-
though mixed uses are occasionally allowed.56 A central tenet of zoning 
law is that residences are generally protected from the harmful effects 
of industrial usage.57 
 The Supreme Court decided zoning was within the state’s police 
powers in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.58 The village’s zoning plan 
prohibited the plaintiff from developing the property for industrial 
purposes.59 The plaintiff argued that the zoning plan amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking.60 The Court held, however, that this was a valid 
                                                                                                                      
48 See U.S. Const. amend. X; Buzbee, supra note 8, at 99–101 (explaining the lack of 
federal intervention in land-use planning); LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125 (explaining how 
local land-use planning results in irrational land uses). 
49 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125 (noting that very few states have attempted to im-
plement land-use controls). The Coastal Zone Management Act is one of the few statutes 
that uses land-use measures to achieve an environmental end. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 
(2006); see LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125–26 & n.9. 
50 Fischel, supra note 42, at 403. 
51 Anthony Flint, This Land: The Battle over Sprawl and the Future of Amer-
ica 28–30 (2006); Rog, supra note 8, at 708–09. 
52 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 403–04; Rohan & Kelly, supra note 37, § 1.03[2][c]. 
53 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 403. 
54 See id. at 403–04, 409. 
55 Rohan & Kelly, supra note 37, § 1.03[2][d]. 
56 See id. § 1.03[2][a]; see e.g., Somerville, Mass., Ordinances art. 6, §  6.4 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2140 (providing an example of mixed-use zoning). 
57 Rohan & Kelly, supra note 37, § 1.03[2]. 
58 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926). 
59 Id. at 384–85. 
60 Id. at 384. 
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exercise of the village’s police power.61 After Euclid, all fifty states en-
acted zoning laws that led to the disjointed land-use patterns prevalent 
in the United States today.62 
C. Urban Sprawl 
1. What Is Urban Sprawl? 
 Anthony Flint defined urban sprawl as “low-density development 
that disperses the population over the widest possible area, with rigidly 
separated functions---homes, shops, and workplaces---connected by lim-
ited-access roadways.”63 Another scholar, Janice C. Griffith, described 
sprawl as uncoordinated single-use development requiring automobiles 
because of its low density and lack of integrated land use.64 
 This development, however, was intentional. Influential Americans, 
such as Henry Ford and Frank Lloyd Wright, supported an exodus from 
cities to the suburbs, fueled by cars and suburban development.65 
“[S]uburbia has become the quintessential physical achievement of the 
United States.”66 By 1990, the majority of Americans lived in low-density 
suburbs.67 
2. What Caused Sprawl? 
 A confluence of the desire to escape the dirty, morally corrupt in-
ner city, the widespread use of Euclidian zoning, and federal housing 
and transportation policies popularized sprawl development in the 
United States.68 Post-World War II federal policies encouraged sprawl 
development by both increasing demand for single-family homes and 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 396–97. 
62 See id. at 391; Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 838 (6th ed. 2006); LaCroix, su-
pra note 4, at 125. 
63 Flint, supra note 51, at 47; Rog, supra note 8, at 711. Anthony Flint is an author and 
Director of Public Affairs at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, a Cambridge, Massachu-
setts-based think tank. Faculty, Fellows and Staff, Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, http:// 
www.lincolninst.edu/aboutlincoln/faculty_staff.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
64 See Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The Need for Regional Govern-
ments, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1019, 1021 (2001). 
65 David Owen, Green Metropolis: Why Living Smaller, Living Closer, and 
Driving Less Are the Keys to Sustainability 36, 107–09 (2009); Rog, supra note 8, at 
709. 
66 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United 
States 4 (1985). 
67 Oren, supra note 33, at 166–67. 
68 Flint, supra note 51, at 28–30, 34; Rog, supra note 8, at 709–12. 
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developing a federal interstate highway system.69 The federal govern-
ment also made the use of automobiles, and thus the ability to develop 
away from urban cores, easier by allowing drivers to externalize the 
costs of using roadways.70 One of these externalized costs is air pollu-
tion due to GHG emissions.71 
 Areas that were previously inaccessible became available for resi-
dential and economic development.72 For middle class Americans, the 
automobile provided a means of escape from the grime of the city to 
the open spaces and clean air of the suburbs.73 It offered the ability for 
Americans to travel to work without the constraints of public transpor-
tation schedules.74 Sprawl development, however, is part of a reinforc-
ing cycle.75 As people move out of the city and into the suburbs, an im-
poverished urban center is left behind, which in turn spawns more 
flight from urban areas.76 
 Southern, southwestern, and western cities developed in the 1950s 
were designed around the assumption that people would commute via 
automobile.77 In the Northeast, by contrast, older cities, developed prior 
to the automobile, were designed to accommodate travel by foot or pub-
lic transit.78 Vehicle trips and VMTs increased almost 3% annually from 
1969 to 1990.79 Car ownership also increased since the signing of the 
CAA in 1970, with only 0.88 vehicles per licensed driver in 1969 com-
pared to 1.21 vehicles per licensed driver in 2007.80 Both VMTs and au-
                                                                                                                      
69 Andres Duany et al., Suburban Nation; The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline 
of the American Dream 7–8 (2000); Flint, supra note 51, at 34; Rog, supra note 8, at 
711–12. 
70 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 84–85. 
71 See id. at 84–86; Donnellan, supra note 5, at 711. 
72 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 64. 
73 Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Imple-
menting a National Program at the Local Level, 27 Pac. L.J. 1521, 1535 (1996). 
74 Id. 
75 See Flint, supra note 51, at 35; Buzbee, supra note 8, at 65. 
76 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 65. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 60; McGarity, supra note 73, at 1535. 
79 Oren, supra note 33, at 160. 
80 Vehicle Technologies Program Fact #574: Vehicles per Licensed Driver Rising, U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy Vehicle Technologies Program, ( June 8, 2009), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/ 
vehiclesandfuels/facts/2009_fotw574.html. There was a total of approximately 256 million 
passenger vehicles registered in the U.S. in 2008. Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, 
Vessels, and Other Conveyances, Research and Innovative Tech. Admin., Bureau of Transp. 
Stats., http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_ 
11.html (last visited May 16, 2012). 
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tomobile ownership contribute to climate change through the emission 
of GHGs.81 
3. Sprawl’s Detrimental Effects 
 Sprawl development and suburban living creates a lifestyle where 
citizens must use automobiles to accomplish daily tasks that they previ-
ously accomplished on foot.82 Spreading development and dependency 
on automobiles contributes to GHG emissions.83 The American trans-
portation sector comprises 33% of all carbon dioxide emissions, and this 
number is expected to rise to 36% in the next 10 years.84 Transportation 
accounts for approximately 50% of the net increase in total U.S. GHG 
emissions since 1990, making the transportation industry the fastest 
growing source of GHG emissions.85 Approximately 80% of total cur-
rent transportation emissions result from vehicle travel on roadways.86 
II. Existing Laws Regulating Climate Change and Land Use 
A. Federal Law 
1. The Clean Air Act 
 The federal government currently regulates greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from automotive vehicles through the CAA.87 Prior 
to the CAA, there was no serious federal involvement in the field of air 
quality.88 Congress enacted federal legislation in response to a 1963 
episode of smog-like air pollution that killed 200 people in New York 
City.89 At the same time, Southern California developed a chronic air 
pollution problem.90 Ultimately, the CAA arose from Congressional 
findings “that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Donnellan, supra note 5, at 711; supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
82 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125. 
83 Buzbee, supra note 8, at 59, 73. 
84 Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 361. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. Additionally, researchers analyzed surveys on travel data from California house-
holds and found that households located in denser residential areas drove approximately 
1200 miles less each year than households in less dense areas. Id. at 363. This research 
shows how vehicle miles traveled in denser areas are lower and might contribute fewer 
GHGs to the atmosphere. See id. 
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7554 (2006). 
88 Reitze, supra note 30, at 696. 
89 See id. at 698. 
90 See id. at 696. 
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brought about by . . . the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted 
in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare.”91 
 By targeting different sources and types of air pollution, the CAA 
grants the EPA broad discretion in implementing a variety of air pollu-
tion programs.92 Implementation is based on a cooperative federalism 
framework, giving some regulatory power to the states and retaining 
some for the federal government.93 The CAA primarily regulates the 
emission of air pollution through two titles: Title I predominantly gov-
erns stationary sources,94 and Title II governs mobile sources.95 Sta-
tionary sources are pollution-emitting entities that stay in one place, 
such as factories.96 Mobile sources include motor vehicles, which are 
pollution-emitting entities that travel.97 
 Title I strives for better air quality by setting nationwide pollution 
limits that states can achieve through their own regulatory measures.98 It 
also regulates ambient air quality by having the EPA set the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to ensure safe levels of criteria 
pollutants for public health.99 The states must then develop State Im-
plementation Plans (SIPs) to achieve or maintain the NAAQS.100 EPA-
approved SIPs have the force of federal law.101 The cooperative federal-
ism framework allows states to address local problems in individualized 
ways while meeting a federal minimum safety standard.102 
 Title II regulates mobile sources, including cars, light-duty trucks, 
and diesel trucks.103 The Title allows the EPA to set federal emission 
standards for new vehicles.104 Title II requires the EPA to regulate any 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2). 
92 Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does Chevron 
Set the EPA Free?, 29 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 283, 287 (2010). 
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410. 
94 See generally id. §§ 7401–7415 (providing the provisions for Title I of the CAA). 
95 See generally id. §§ 7521–7590 (providing the provisions for Title II of the CAA). 
96 See id. § 7411(a)(3). 
97 See id. § 7550(2). 
98 Id. §§ 7408–7410. 
99 42 U.S.C. § 7409. Though Title I is predominantly geared toward stationary sources, 
it allows states to reduce criteria pollutants in the ambient air by limiting mobile source 
emissions. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(B); see Donnellan, supra note 5, at 727. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
101 Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 488 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Trs. for 
Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1210 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)); Natural Res. Def. Council v. S. Coast 
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
102 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410. 
103 Id. §§ 7521–7554. 
104 Id. § 7521. Title II’s “technology forcing” requirements motivated automobile man-
ufacturers to develop cleaner technologies that were not invented at the time Congress 
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air pollutants, not just criteria pollutants, that pose a danger to public 
health.105 The EPA determines if an emission is a pollutant and is dan-
gerous to public health by making an endangerment finding.106 
2. Massachusetts v. EPA and Endangerment Finding 
 Until recently, the EPA did not use the CAA to regulate GHGs emit-
ted from new vehicles as air pollutants.107 In 2007, the Supreme Court 
held GHGs from new motor vehicles could be regulated under the 
CAA.108 In that case, Massachusetts and a number of environmental or-
ganizations sued the EPA to compel the EPA Administrator to regulate 
GHGs as an air pollutant under Title II of the CAA.109 The Court, con-
trary to arguments by the EPA, identified GHGs as air pollutants, not 
just in Title II, but throughout the CAA.110 The Court, however, did not 
require that the EPA automatically and immediately regulate GHGs un-
der the CAA.111 The decision required the EPA to make an endanger-
ment finding, which meant that the EPA must either find that GHGs 
endanger the public, that GHGs do not endanger the public, or that the 
Agency must explain why they could not make an endangerment find-
ing.112 According to the Court, if GHGs endanger the public health and 
welfare, the CAA requires the EPA to regulate them.113 
 In December 2009, the EPA issued a final endangerment finding 
stating that the Administrator found “six greenhouse gases taken in 
combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of 
current and future generations” and “the combined emissions of these 
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle en-
                                                                                                                      
enacted the CAA. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air 
Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 99, 114 (2006). 
105 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
106 Id.; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). 
107 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (highlighting that 2010 was 
the first year for regulation of GHG emissions). 
108 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528. The Court held that the CAA could regulate 
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles despite the EPA’s contentions that this piecemeal 
approach to climate change would conflict with the President’s attempts to address the 
problem. Id. at 513, 533. This included the President’s ability to persuade nations like Chi-
na and India to reduce their GHG emissions. Id. at 513. 
109 Id. at 505. The EPA argued that GHGs were not air pollutants under the CAA. Id. at 
513. 
110 Id. at 532; Richardson, supra note 92, at 292. 
111 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532–33; Richardson, supra note 92, at 292. 
112 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533–35; Richardson, supra note 92, at 292. 
113 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533. 
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gines contribute” to that potential harm.114 The endangerment finding 
requires the EPA to regulate mobile source emissions.115 
3. EPA Regulations in Response to the Endangerment Finding 
 On May 7, 2010, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration issued a final rule that established standards for cars and 
trucks in the 2012 to 2016 model years.116 
The EPA GHG standards require these vehicles to meet an es-
timated combined average emissions level of 250 grams of car-
bon dioxide (CO2) per mile in model year 2016, equivalent to 
35.5 miles per gallon (mpg) if the automotive industry were to 
meet this CO2 level all through fuel economy improvements.117 
The EPA projects that by 2030 this rulemaking will reduce U.S. light-
duty GHG emissions by twenty-one percent over what would have oc-
curred in the absence of regulation.118 
B.State Law Examples 
1. California Sustainable Communities Strategy and Climate Protection 
Act—Senate Bill 375 
 Recently, California enacted legislation to combat climate change 
by curbing GHG emissions, in part by attempting to promote smarter 
growth.119 California is the most populous U.S. state, with a population 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
115 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 530; Richardson, supra note 92, at 293. 
116 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 
117 EPA, EPA-420-F-10-014, Regulatory Announcement: EPA and NHTSA Finalize 
Historic National Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy 
for Cars and Trucks 1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/ 
420f10014.pdf. 
118 Id. at 2. The estimated benefits of the ruling are that “over the lifetime of the vehi-
cles sold during 2012–2016, this national program is projected to reduce U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions by 960 million metric tons and save 1.8 billion barrels of oil.” Id. 
119 See SB 375, supra note 11. As this section is an overview of SB 375, it does not discuss 
other legal or regulatory mechanisms in California that work to combat climate change. See 
generally Nichols, Lessons, supra note 11 (discussing SB 375 and California’s other climate 
change laws and regulations); Mary D. Nichols, Sustainable Communities for a Sustainable State: 
California’s Efforts to Curb Sprawl and Cut Global Warming Emissions, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 185 
(2010) [hereinafter Nichols, Sustainable Communities] (discussing SB 375’s context and back-
ground). Mary D. Nichols is the current chairman of the California Air Resources Board, the 
air pollution agency for California, and was instrumental in the passing of AB 32. See Mary D. 
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of approximately thirty-seven million.120 The battle for cleaner air in 
California, and especially in Southern California, began in the 1940s 
when Los Angeles had its first major smog episodes.121 Southern Cali-
fornia notoriously has some of the worst air quality in the nation.122 
 The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), set out 
greenhouse gas reduction goals for California that the California Sus-
tainable Communities Strategy and Climate Protection Act (SB 375) 
intends to achieve.123 AB 32 set the goal of reducing carbon emissions 
in California to 1990 levels by 2020.124 The emissions reduction repre-
sents an approximately decrease in GHG levels by thirty percent com-
pared to levels if AB 32 never passed.125 The bill also put the California 
Air Resource Board (CARB) in charge of developing plans to reduce 
GHG emissions from automobile transport.126 
 Governor Schwarzenegger approved SB 375, a transportation 
planning and anti-sprawl statute, on September 30, 2008.127 Senator 
Steinberg, the Senate leader at the time of passage, stated that the bill 
“will be used as the national framework for fighting sprawl and trans-
forming inevitable growth to smart growth.”128 
                                                                                                                      
 
Nichols, Chairman, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency: Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
board/bio/marynichols.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
120 See U.S. Census Bureau, National and State Population Estimates, http:// 
www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2011/index.html (follow “XLS” under “Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto 
Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011”) (last visited May 18, 2012); U.S. Census Bureau, 
State & County Quickfacts: California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
06000.html (last revised Jan. 17, 2012). 
121 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 
1110 (2009). 
122 Id. 
123 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, § 38,550, 2005–2006 Legis. Sess. 
pt. 4 (West Supp. 2012) (codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38,500, 38,501, 
38,505, 38,510, 38,530, 38,550, 38,560, 38,560.5, 38,561, 38,563–38,565, 38,570, 38,571, 
38,574, 38,580, 38,590–38,599 (West Supp. 2012)) [hereinafter AB 32], available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/ab32text.pdf; Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Facts About Assembly Bill 32, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/fact 
sheets/ab32factsheet.pdf. 
124 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38,550. 
125 Nichols, Lessons, supra note 11, at 199–200; see Alyssa Sherman, Linking Transporta-
tion to Air Quality in California, Tech Transfer, Summer 2010, at 10, 10, available at 
http://www.techtransfer.berkeley.edu/newsletter/10-3/10-3.pdf. 
126 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38,501(f); Nichols, Lessons, supra note 11, at 199; 
Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 123. 
127 SB 375, supra note 11. 
128 Press Release, Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg, Governor Signs Stein-
berg’s Landmark Climate Change/Land Use Bill (Sept. 30, 2008), http://sd06.senate.ca. 
gov/news/2008-09-30-governor-signs-steinberg-s-landmark-climate-changeland-use-bill; Bill 
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 SB 375 governs the eighteen California Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs), which include thirty-seven of fifty-eight Califor-
nia counties and a majority of the state’s population.129 MPOs are 
transportation policy-making organizations tasked with coordinating 
land use, housing, and transportation.130 Once CARB sets emissions 
reduction targets for the period of 2020 to 2035, MPOs then design 
plans to meet those goals.131 In this way, SB 375 does not take power 
away from the local level for land-use planning, over which the cities 
and counties continue to retain authority.132 
 On September 23, 2010, CARB adopted greenhouse gas emissions 
targets for each metropolitan region in California covered by the law.133 
After CARB designates regional greenhouse gas emissions targets, MPOs 
must create a “Sustainable Communities Strategy” that describes how 
these goals will be achieved.134 If the Sustainable Communities Strategy 
will not meet the reduction targets, an MPO must put forth an “Alterna-
tive Planning Strategy” to achieve the goals.135 These strategies become 
part of the Regional Transportation Plan, which relates this strategy to 
federal transportation law by reducing GHG emissions from automobile 
travel.136 
 SB 375 contains potentially powerful exemptions from the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and also allows for stream-
lined projects.137 SB 375 exempts certain projects from CEQA if they 
conform to the Sustainable Communities Strategy.138 “Transit-priority 
                                                                                                                      
Fulton, SB 375 Is Now Law—But What Will It Do?, Cal. Plan. & Dev. Rep. (Oct. 1, 2008, 
8:32 AM), http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2140. 
129 See Nichols, Sustainable Communities, supra note 119, at 186; Sherman, supra note 
125. 
130See Cal. Gov’t Code § 14,522.1 (West Supp. 2012); see Nichols, Sustainable Communi-
ties, supra note 119, at 186; Sherman, supra note 125. 
131 SB 375, supra note 11; Cal Gov’t Code § 65,080(a), (b)(2)(A); see Fulton, supra 
note 128. 
132 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,080(b)(2)(K); Nichols, Sustainable Communities, supra note 
119, at 188. 
133 Air Res. Bd., Resolution 10-31, Regional Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets 
Pursuant to SB 375, at 1, 13–14 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/ 
final.resolution.10.31.pdf. 
134 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,080(b)(2)(B); Prum & Catz, supra note 11, at 955–56. 
135 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,080 (b)(2)(I); Prum & Catz, supra note 11, at 955–56. 
136 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,080 (b)(2)(B). The Regional Transportation Plan must be 
consistent with these strategies. See Fulton, supra note 128. 
137 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21,151.1(West Supp. 2012); Anika E. Leerssen, Smart Growth 
and Green Building: An Effective Partnership to Significantly Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 26 
J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 287, 309–10 (2011); Fulton, supra note 128. 
138 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21,151.1. 
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projects” are also eligible for CEQA streamlining and exemptions.139 
“Transit-priority projects” must contain at least fifty percent residential 
use, have a minimum density of twenty units per acre, and be located 
within a half-mile of a major transit stop.140 These types of projects 
would produce less sprawl and GHG emissions.141 
 SB 375 does not alter the current structure of California transpor-
tation policy because it keeps the decision-making authority with local 
officials on MPO boards.142 Instead, it uses transportation funding as an 
incentive for cities that comply with the Sustainable Communities Strat-
egy.143 
2. Atlanta, Georgia’s Regional Transportation Authority 
 The Greater Atlanta region in Georgia instituted a regional growth 
plan to curb air pollution emitted from automobiles.144 Metropolitan 
Atlanta has approximately 5.5 million people, and in the recent past, 
has added new residents at a rate faster than almost every other U.S. 
metropolitan area.145 Atlanta has no geographical boundaries to limit 
urban growth, and the resulting sprawl from the population explosion 
has led some to refer to it as the “New Los Angeles.”146 The metropoli-
tan region, which in 1999 was 110 miles across, is one of the largest ar-
eas in the country and has been referred to as “the fastest-spreading 
human settlement in history.”147 The primary mode of transportation 
in metropolitan Atlanta is the automobile.148 
                                                                                                                      
139 Id. § 21,155–21,155.1. 
140 Id. § 21,155(b). 
141 SB 375, supra note 11, § 1(c) (development near public transit sources allows peo-
ple to use automobiles less frequently, which discourages sprawling development); see 
Nichols, Sustainable Communities, supra note 119, at 186. 
142 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,080(b)(2)(K) (West Supp. 2012). 
143 See Leerssen, supra note 137, at 307–08. 
144 Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32 (2009). 
145 See Arthur C. Nelson, New Kid in Town: The Georgia Regional Transportation Authority 
and Its Role in Managing Growth in Metropolitan Georgia, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 625, 626 
(2000); Orlyn O. Lockard, III, Note, Solving the “Tragedy:” Transportation, Pollution and Re-
gionalism in Atlanta, 19 Va. Envtl. L.J. 161, 172 (2000). 
146 Lockard, supra note 145, at 172; see Keith Aoki, All the King’s Horses and All the King’s 
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ning, Portland Metro and Oregon’s Measure 37, 21 J. L. & Pol. 397, 422–23 (2005). 
147 Lockard, supra note 145, at 173–74 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Richard 
Lacayo, The Brawl over Sprawl, Time, Mar. 22, 1999, at 44, 45); see also Nelson, supra note 
145, at 626 (describing Atlanta’s rapid growth). 
148 Lockard, supra note 145, at 174. In 2000, Atlanta residents drove more miles per 
capita than residents in any other U.S. city. Nelson, supra note 145, at 626. 
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 In addition to the many benefits associated with decreasing VMTs, 
Georgia stood to lose 900 million dollars in federal funding if the state 
did not come into attainment with CAA standards.149 The Georgia leg-
islature enacted Senate Bill 57 to avoid losing this funding, to decrease 
pollution, and to relieve traffic congestion.150 Senate Bill 57 established 
the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA) to manage 
transportation and air quality within certain areas of the state.151 The 
legislature gave GRTA wide authority to combat Georgia’s transporta-
tion-related pollution problems.152 These powers include the ability to 
plan and construct public transportation systems, to coordinate plan-
ning for land transportation and air quality purposes among state, re-
gional, and local authorities, and to receive federal money for transit, 
air quality, and other purposes for the alleviation of air congestion and 
air pollution.153 The Governor can give GRTA the power to review, im-
prove, modify, and implement plans for improving Atlanta’s transporta-
tion and air quality.154 Furthermore, GRTA wields the power to with-
hold “any state grant of any kind whatsoever except such grants as may 
be related directly to the physical and mental health, education, and 
police protection of its residents” if a local government “fails or refuses 
to plan, coordinate, and implement” regional transportation projects 
and plans.155 
 GRTA has jurisdiction over non-attainment areas, which are areas 
that do not meet the NAAQS for a specific criteria pollutant.156 GRTA 
also has jurisdiction over attainment areas that become non-attainment 
for a particular pollutant.157 Furthermore, after an area achieves at-
tainment, GRTA retains jurisdiction for twenty years ensuring long term 
compliance.158 Because jurisdiction only arises after non-attainment in 
                                                                                                                      
149 Lockard, supra note 145, at 182–83, 192; see Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Be-
tween Home Rule and Regional Planning, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 539, 555 (2000); Donald 
Lee Biola, State Government Georgia Regional Transportation Authority Act: Provide for a Regional 
Transportation Authority, 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1999). 
150 Lockard, supra note 145, at 182–83, 192; see Alexander, supra note 149, at 555; Rob-
ert D. Bullard et al., The Costs and Consequences of Suburban Sprawl: The Case of Metro Atlanta, 
17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 935, 998 (2001); Nelson, supra note 145, at 633–34. 
151 Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32-3(a) (2009). 
152 Id. §§ 50-32-10(c) to -11. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. § 50-32-13. 
155 Id. § 50-32-53(a). 
156 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32-10(b)(3) (including non-attainment 
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157 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32-10(b)(3). 
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specific areas, GRTA is neither a comprehensive land-use approach nor 
a preventative measure.159 Though not aimed at GHGs specifically, 
GRTA addresses air pollution with its regional transportation planning 
measures.160 
III. Land-Use Planning’ s Potential to Slow  
Global Climate Change 
A. Smart Growth 
 Reacting to the detrimental effects of sprawl development, the 
smart growth movement progressed rapidly since the mid-1990s.161 
Jane Jacobs, in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, laid a founda-
tion for what she thought were the essential elements of vibrant and 
healthy cities162—high density, mixed uses, pedestrian friendly streets, 
and the preservation of historic buildings.163 The smart growth move-
ment encompasses many of Jacobs’s ideas and provides models for anti-
sprawl development.164 
 Though not a cohesive movement, central principles of smart 
growth development include: (1) creating a range of housing choices 
and opportunities; (2) creating walkable neighborhoods (3) encourag-
ing community collaboration; (4) fostering locations with a strong sense 
of place; (5) making development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-
effective; (6) mixing land uses; (7) preserving open space, farmland, 
natural beauty, and critical environmental areas; (8) providing a variety 
of transportation choices; (9) strengthening and directing development 
into existing communities and; (10) taking advantage of compact build-
ing design.165 Proponents argue that following these principles will cre-
ate mixed-use walkable communities that limit the need for automobile 
use.166 
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160 See id. §§ 50-32-10 to -11. 
161 See Douglas Farr, Sustainable Urbanism: Urban Design with Nature 29–30 
(2008). 
162 See Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities chs. 7–12 (Mod-
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165 Farr, supra note 161, at 29–30. 
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 Studies show smart growth development addresses the problem of 
climate change due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.167 Exchanging 
one car and opting to use public transit would reduce a family’s carbon 
footprint by 25% to 30%.168 Other research has shown that smart 
growth has the potential to reduce per capita Vehicle Miles Travelled 
(VMT) nationwide by up to 40%.169 
 States such as Oregon, Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey also im-
plemented smart growth initiatives.170 In 2001, Portland, Oregon was 
the first city in the United States to adopt a GHG reduction plan using 
smart growth principles.171 Portland’s plan attempted to reduce VMTs 
by coordinating land-use and transportation planning.172 Furthermore, 
Oregon set city boundaries that limited the sprawling growth of urban 
areas.173 Under this plan, per capita VMTs decreased by approximately 
10% and GHG levels were reduced to just above 1990 levels by 2008, 
despite a 14% growth in population.174 
 Scholars have observed that “the only way significant VMT reduc-
tion will be accomplished is with much stronger coordination of land-
use development and transportation infrastructure investments in ur-
banizing parts of the [United States].”175 Smart growth is one method 
scholars suggest for coordinating land-use development and transpor-
tation infrastructure.176 
B. Successful Cooperative Federalism at Work 
 Despite being unable to pass a comprehensive land-use statute,177 
the federal government has some control over land use under various 
                                                                                                                      
 
167 Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 364. 
168 Todd Davis & Monica Hale, Science Applications Int’l Corp., Public Trans-
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169 Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 364. 
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use plans. See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125. 
171 Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 369. 
172 Id. at 368–69. 
173 See id. at 369. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 362. 
176 See id. at 361–62. 
177 Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 3:2 (5th ed. 2010). In 1970 the 
National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA) was introduced as a way to federalize land-use 
planning by incentivizing the production of state land-use plans. Id. NLUPA would have 
also established a national data system in sound land-use planning for the benefit and use 
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federal statutes.178 The federal government controls land use through 
legislation like the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).179 
 The CZMA is an example of a federal statute regulating land 
use.180 The Act identifies a national interest in protection of the coastal 
zone,181 and encourages states to develop and implement coastal zone 
management plans, in part to mitigate the additional pollution of 
coastal waters from land-use activities.182 Participation under the CZMA 
is voluntary for states.183 The federal government funds states that 
submit plans that meet CZMA requirements.184 
 Once approved, the federal government must comply with a state’s 
plan.185 When a federal agency plans a project within a coastal zone, 
the agency must determine if the project would be consistent with the 
state’s plan.186 After the federal agency sends the state its consistency 
determination, the state responds by either agreeing or disagreeing.187 
The CZMA provides several approaches to resolve conflicts between the 
states and the federal agency, including mediation.188 The federal ad-
ministrator must “conduct a continuing review of the performance of 
coastal states with respect to coastal management.”189 This structure 
influences land-use decisions for an environmental purpose by dividing 
power between state and federal governments.190 Under the CZMA, the 
federal government incentivizes state action through grants and has the 
ability to deny applications, while states can address local problems us-
ing individualized methods.191 
 Some scholars argue that a cooperative federalism framework simi-
lar to Title I of the CAA may be used to coerce the states to form com-
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178 See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
179 See id. 
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Clause in the 1990’s: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U. Colo. 
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182 Id. § 1451; see Malone, supra note 180, at 712–14. 
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184 Id. §§ 1455, 1455a, 1461(e). 
185 Id. § 1456. 
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187 Id. § 1456(c). 
188 Id. § 1456(h). 
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prehensive land-use plans.192 The State Implementation Plan frame-
work, with each state tailoring individualized solutions, provides an ex-
ample of a successful cooperative federalism structure for air pollu-
tion.193 This framework enables states to address their problems in a 
local manner while taking national environmental concerns into con-
sideration.194 
IV. The Land-Use Advantage to Solving GHG Emissions 
 To curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and reduce them to safe 
levels, the underlying causes of the problem need to be addressed.195 To 
combat the emissions of GHGs by the transportation industry, the num-
ber of Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) must be reduced.196 Reduction 
can be achieved through smart growth strategies that coordinate land-
use development and transportation infrastructure investments in ur-
banizing areas—thus reducing VMTs by enabling and encouraging non-
automobile trips and decreasing automobile trip distances.197 The EPA’s 
regulations on new vehicle emissions represent progress toward this 
end, but they are not comprehensive or substantial enough to abate 
climate change.198 The Georgia Regional Transportation Authority 
(GRTA) and California Sustainable Communities Strategy and Climate 
Protection Act (SB 375) use the correct approach by addressing land-
use patterns as contributing to GHG emissions and air pollution, but 
they are not comprehensive.199 The federal government should use a 
framework that implements cooperative federalism by borrowing the 
strengths of both GRTA and SB 375.200 A cooperative federalism frame-
work would allow states and regional governments to consider local is-
                                                                                                                      
192 See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 4, at 127; Rog, supra note 8, at 726–27. 
193 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2006). 
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195 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 124–27; Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 361–63. 
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through smarter land use helps reduce GHGs). 
199 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125 (indicating that very few states have implemented 
statewide land-use controls); supra notes 132, 158–159 and accompanying text. 
200 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32 (2009); SB 375, supra note 11; LaCroix, supra note 4, at 
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sues and devise individualized approaches to meet the federal govern-
ment’s standards.201 
A. EPA Emissions Requirements Represent Progress,  
but Additional Action Is Necessary 
 The EPA’s recognition that GHGs are pollutants under the CAA 
and that they endanger the public will enable the EPA to slow climate 
change through GHG regulation.202 These regulations, however, do not 
address the underlying source of GHG emissions.203 
 The EPA regulations contain no provision for capping VMTs.204 
Capping emissions of GHGs on new vehicles will limit the amount of 
GHGs each vehicle can emit,205 but there is no authority in the CAA to 
limit the number of vehicles on the road or the amount of miles that 
they travel.206 The lack of regulation for VMTs sets no ceiling on pollut-
ants.207 Therefore, the EPA’s GHG limits might slow GHG emissions, 
but will not reverse the trend of increasing emissions overall.208 Despite 
buying new cars that emit less GHGs per mile travelled, people may be 
travelling further distances to get to their destinations due to the con-
tinuing expansion of cities.209 Furthermore, in addition to sprawling 
development, more people are becoming car owners.210 Therefore, 
GHG emissions will ultimately rise and the CAA will not abate climate 
change.211 
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fastest growing GHG emitting sector, transportation accounts for forty-seven percent of the 
net increase in U.S. GHG emissions since 1990). 
209 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 531.1–.5, 533.1–.6; Buzbee, supra note 8, at 67. 
210 Research and Innovative Tech. Admin.: Bureau of Transp. Stats., supra note 
80. 
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 Thus, the EPA’s GHG limits on new model year cars neglect the 
important issue with emissions—sprawling urban development pat-
terns.212 Even though these new limits do not fully address the underly-
ing issue of GHG emissions, they add to the CAA’s arsenal of regulatory 
schemes.213 These limitations can be a first step for the federal gov-
ernment in regulating GHGs, by pressuring states to regulate in other 
ways, and starting a public discussion on how to address global climate 
change.214 
B. Land-Use Regulation Is the Central Issue with Climate Change 
 The state and regional approaches seen in California and Atlanta 
are preferable to the CAA approach because they address land use’s 
impact on GHG emissions and air pollution.215 
1. California Curbs GHGs by Incentivizing Smarter Growth 
 Despite having unknown long-term effects on GHG emissions, SB 
375 provides a cohesive approach to limiting sprawl development and 
slowing climate change.216 SB 375’s smart growth plan attempts to re-
duce VMTs,217 and incentivizes smarter development plans by stream-
lining and providing exemptions for projects that conform to the Sus-
tainable Communities Strategy (SCS).218 It does not halt inevitable 
development in the state.219 Instead, it allows for speedy building of 
smart-growth developments that meet the SCS or are located within a 
close distance to preexisting mass transit service, and satisfy minimum 
densities and mixed uses.220 Thus, SB 375 prioritizes smarter develop-
                                                                                                                      
212 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (noting an absence of land 
use regulations); Rawlings & Paterson, supra note 3, at 361. 
213 See Richardson, supra note 92, at 287. 
214 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324; Lockard, supra note 145, at 185 (discuss-
ing public consensus and political action in Georgia contributing to the creation of the 
GRTA). 
215 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32 (2009); SB 375, supra note 11; Rawlings & Paterson, su-
pra note 3, at 361 (describing the need for smarter growth to reduce GHG emissions). 
216 See Nichols, Lessons, supra note 11, at 206–07; Fulton, supra note 128 (tying land use, 
transportation, and housing decisions together). 
217 See supra notes 119–143 and accompanying text. 
218 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21,151.1 (West Supp. 2011). 
219 See Fulton, supra note 128 (discussing how SB 375 was designed to create regional 
growth plans that are sustainable and not to halt development). 
220 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21,151.1. 
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ment, designed to reduce GHGs, over the status quo.221 SB 375 pro-
vides a model for region-wide smarter development that will lower 
GHG emissions and alleviate local air pollution and other social ills 
caused by sprawl.222 
 Despite SB 375’s laudable goals, it has some shortfalls. SB 375’s 
approach is not comprehensive as it applies to only thirty-seven of the 
fifty-eight counties in California.223 The California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) does not make policy decisions regarding the methods for 
achieving GHG reduction goals.224 Furthermore, SB 375 does not re-
move land-use powers from local governments, but instead local gov-
ernment officials make decisions through the MPOs, and therefore 
“the state has no authority over local land-use policy.”225 SB 375 does 
mandate localities to adopt land-use plans.226 California will not penal-
ize regions for missing targets but it will deprive them of incentives.227 
The federal government could incentivize state action to implement 
plans like SB 375 by attaching funding to region or state-wide plans that 
use smart growth to combat GHG emissions.228 
2. Atlanta’s GRTA Approach Could Potentially Be Tailored to Address 
GHG Emissions 
 Atlanta’s GRTA provides another region-wide approach to con-
necting land use, transportation, and air pollution.229 Although GRTA 
was designed to combat criteria pollutants in non-attainment areas, the 
approach of regulating land uses to limit car emissions also has the an-
                                                                                                                      
221 See id. (streamlining allows SB 375 to fast-track sustainable development projects). 
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223 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. SB 375 is not the only climate change 
tool in California. Nichols discusses other tools in Lessons, supra note 11, at 198, 203–06. 
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cillary effect of limiting GHG emissions.230 Like SB 375, GRTA’s ap-
proach could be applied in other regions as a way to combat GHG 
emissions.231 
 The GRTA program represents significant progress in furthering 
the traditional role of state and local powers over land-use planning 
and transportation.232 The issue with local planning is that contiguous 
regions are not accountable to each other and planning does not con-
sider larger environmental effects.233 Although local governments may 
be attuned to local problems more readily than the federal govern-
ment, they do not address concerns outside of their locality.234 For 
land-use regulation, this is a major problem because localities some-
times externalize environmental costs.235 
 One of GRTA’s major successes was transferring some decision-
making authority away from local governments to a regional entity that 
can consider the connections and relevant variables between locali-
ties.236 Some of the stronger aspects of GRTA’s power include its ability 
to “plan, design, acquire, construct, add to, extend, improve, equip, op-
erate . . . land public transportation systems,” veto transportation plans 
of MPOs, refuse roadway access to projects that do not align with the 
program’s goals, and essentially force compliance by sanctioning locali-
ties with the loss of federal and state funding for not aligning with 
GRTA’s programs.237 These powers could also serve as a model for other 
jurisdictions or agencies planning on a regional or state-wide level. 
 Though there are some strong aspects to the GRTA program, there 
were important weaknesses that would make exporting a similarly styled 
structure to other regions potentially ineffective. Primarily, GRTA’s 
powers over transportation only allow for indirect effects on land-use 
                                                                                                                      
230 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32-10(b)(3) (2009); LaCroix, supra note 4, at 124 (establish-
ing that significant amounts of GHGs come from automobile usage). 
231 See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-32 (similarly requiring regional land use and transportation 
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ronmental Protection Agency, 27 Ecology L.Q. 841, 873, 876 (2000). 
233 See LaCroix, supra note 4, at 125. 
234 See Griffith, supra note 64, at 1026 (discussing the need for regional land-use gov-
ernance); cf. Buzbee, supra note 8, at 84–85 (discussing the idea that sprawl allows locali-
ties to externalize the costs of their development patterns). 
235 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 84–85. 
236 See, e.g., Lockard, supra note 145, at 191; Nelson, supra note 145, at 634–35. 
237 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 50-32-10(b)(1), 50-32-11(a)(3), (33), 50-32-14, 50-32-53(a) (2009); 
see Alexander, supra note 149, at 557; Nelson, supra note 145, at 633–37; Yarne, supra note 
232, at 873. 
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decision making.238 GRTA only applies to non-attainment areas and 
therefore is not comprehensive, as it does not have jurisdiction over the 
entire state or region.239 GRTA’s jurisdiction would only arise after there 
is non-attainment under the CAA and therefore would only address air 
pollutants after serious issues arise.240 GRTA does not act in a preventa-
tive capacity, and ultimately allows areas in Georgia to fall out of attain-
ment.241 Environmentalists may have had high hopes for GRTA, but 
some see it as ineffective because the program did not exercise its pow-
ers to the fullest extent possible due to political considerations.242 
C. Smart Growth and Cooperative Federalism Offer a Partial Solution 
 The federal government needs to enact more comprehensive fed-
eral land-use legislation.243 The need is clear, considering that few re-
gional programs address GHG emissions, and they are not comprehen-
sive.244 To do this, federal policymakers must understand how local and 
state land-use decisions are connected.245 Policymakers must see subur-
ban areas as burdening urban areas with increased traffic congestion 
and air pollution, which are byproducts of increased automobile use.246 
The land-use policies of one local authority might adversely affect the 
surrounding localities because air pollution and externalized costs do 
not stop at locality lines.247 Furthermore, the ability to have intercon-
nected mass transit systems relies on either cooperation between local 
governments or a higher governing authority that can bridge the gap 
between them.248 
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 Georgia and California have similar air pollution and GHG prob-
lems.249 Both of these locations provide examples of how to structure 
air pollutant legislation. These laws do not exist in isolation, but instead 
are surrounded by other climate and transportation laws.250 They can, 
however, provide a starting point for designing federal land use and 
climate change legislation. They provide examples and potential tools 
on regulating the underlying cause of land-use decisions on climate 
change. 
 One of the most important concerns with federal land-use policy is 
intrusion on state power.251 Because land use is historically a state pow-
er, interference from the federal government may initially cause resis-
tance.252 The CAA and the CZMA, however, provide a framework to 
think about land use from a federal perspective.253 In accordance with 
Title I of the CAA, the EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) and delegates to the states or regions the authority to deter-
mine how to meet these standards.254 Though the current structure of 
the CAA does not control land use to a large extent, or provide for ef-
fective GHG emission limitations, it does at least exemplify meaningful 
cooperative federalism.255 
 Mary Nichols, a prominent scholar in the arena, recommends that 
the federal government use California’s programs as a model for a co-
operative federalism framework for the nation.256 The federal govern-
ment should start regulate the effects of land-use on GHGs and air pol-
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251 See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 99–101. 
252 See id. at 99. 
253 See Clean Air Act § 101–115, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7415 (2006); Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). See also supra notes 179–194 and accompany-
ing text (discussing cooperative federalism implementation); Holly Doremus, Through 
Another’s Eyes: The Benefit of Outside Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. 
L. Rev. 247, 258–59 (2011) (discussing the CZMA’s power to encourage states to imple-
ment conservation programs). 
254 Clean Air Act § 108–110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410. The CZMA sets out a floor for 
federal land-use requirements in coastal zones and then the states develop plans to achieve 
this. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466. The state then holds power because any land uses, even fed-
eral ones, need to comply with the state management plan. Id. § 1456(c). 
255 See supra notes 87–106, 216–228 and accompanying text. Furthermore, because of 
the interrelationship of climate change and land use, the CAA might provide a mechanism 
to institute some form of federal land-use policy. 
256 Nichols, Lessons, supra note 11, at 192, 212; see Prum & Catz, supra note 11, at 965–
66 (mentioning the possibility of the federal government adopting the AB 32 and SB 375 
model). Indeed this is what the legislators envisioned. See supra note 128 and accompany-
ing text. 
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lutants, and thus follow the lead of Georgia and California. The gov-
ernment could set floors for regulation for GHG emission similar to the 
NAAQS in the CAA.257 Then the government should delegate to the 
states the methods of compliance with the federally mandated floor. 
This structure would be similar to the CAA, or could possibly become a 
part of the CAA. A cooperative federalism approach is best because 
there will be some resistance to any federal land-use planning—even to 
control GHG emissions—but this resistance can be softened by letting 
state and local governments design and implement individualized plans 
to meet local needs.258 
 The federal government should mix incentives with mandates by 
providing funding incentives like SB 375 and working with an empow-
ered state partner, much like the GRTA program.259 There should be 
meaningful mandates, which are missing from SB 375, to achieve the 
reductions necessary to abate climate change.260 In addition to mean-
ingful mandates, there should be in place in each state or region an 
entity with the power to enforce the state or regional mandates. Some 
of these powers could be modeled after the powers given to GRTA.261 
Therefore, some general land-use powers may stay with localities, but 
the regional or state power could have the ability to veto projects.262 
 Legislation should be comprehensive and apply to the United 
States as a whole. SB 375 covers thirty-seven of California’s fifty-eight 
counties,263 and GRTA only covers areas that are non-attainment.264 A 
federal land-use law must cover all areas to prevent GHG emitting 
sources from moving to different locales to avoid regulation. Smart 
growth is a promising approach to significantly curbing GHG emis-
sions.265 Incentivizing developers to align with smart growth objectives 
through a federally imposed land-use plan, or some form of a regional 
plan, would reduce VMTs, lessen the effect of GHGs, and avoid federal-
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ism issues.266 The United States needs this type of regulation to avoid 
the catastrophic consequences of climate change.267 
Conclusion 
 Because of the United States’s tremendous amount of GHG emis-
sions relative to its population, it must take a leadership role in reduc-
ing GHGs. Although the CAA represents progress toward that goal, it is 
insufficient to solve the problem in its entirety because it puts no limit 
on GHG emissions. Local governments may also limit GHG emissions, 
but this might only happen when pushed by funding or threat of regu-
lation. The United States and the international community cannot rely 
on states to take action like California or Georgia. Instead, the best ap-
proach would be to institute a cooperative federalism framework, set a 
national floor for GHG emissions, and use a combination of mandates 
and incentives based upon the California and Georgia examples. Only 
through nationally comprehensive land-use policy can the United 
States alleviate the pressures of climate change and reverse the plan-
ning mistakes of the past seventy years. 
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